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INTRODUCTION TO BLOTTO GAMES 
A l a n  R. Washburn 
~ a v a l  P o s t g r a d u a t e  School  
M o n t e r e y ,  Ca. 93940 
ABSTRACT 
B l o t t o  games are two-person zero sum games where the 
p l a y e r s  each  divide a r e s o u r c e  amongst s e v e r a l  a r e a s .  This  
t e c h n i c a l  r e p o r t  i s  a n  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  methods for solvi i lg  
them, and i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  be t u t o r i a l  i n  n a t u r e .  However, 
f a m i l i a r i t y  on t h e  part of t h e  r e a d e r  w i th  two-person ze ro  
sum game t h e o r y ,  a s  w e l l  as  t h e  d u a l i t y  theory of l i n e a r  
programming, i s  assumed. 
INTRODUCTION TO BLOTTO GAMES 
by 
Alan R. Washburn 
1. INTRODUCTION 
B l o t t o  Games, as we use t h e  term h e r e ,  a r e  two-person 
zero sum games i n  which each s i d e  has  a s i n g l e  r e s o u r c e  t h a t  
he must a l l o c a t e  t o  K d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  w i thou t  knowing t h e  
a l l o c a t i o n  of t h e  o t h e r  s i d e .  The t o t a l  payoff  is assumed 
t o  be a sum o f  payoffs  i n  t h e  i nd iv idua l  a r e a s .  The methods 
we propose f o r  s o l u t i o n  a r e  e f f i c i e n t  only i f  t h i s  l a c k  of 
knowledge i s  important ;  t h a t  i s ,  t hey  a r e  i n e f f i c i e n t  f o r  
games t h a t  have saddle  p o i n t s .  
This  r e p o r t  d e a l s  a lmost  e n t i r e l y  wi th  methods f o r  
s o l v i n g  B l o t t o  Games, o r  a t  l e a s t  f o r  almost  s o l v i n g  them. 
Sec t ion  2 d e a l s  wi th  p re l imina ry  b u t  v i t a l  m a t e r i a l  on 
Moment Games. We w i l l  f i n d  t h a t  Moment G a m e s  can be solved 
by making a Lagrangian s e a r c h  i n  two dimensions,  us ing  L inea r  
Programming. I n  Sec t ion  3,  we w i l l  d i s cove r  t h a t  Eilot to 
Games can be s o l v e d  by s o l v i n g  a s s o c i a t e d  Moment Games, 
s u b j e c t  t o  a q u a l i f i c a t i o n  on t h e  p l a y a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  Moment 
Game s t r a t e g i e s .  P l a y a b i l i t y  is  d i scussed  i n  more d e t a i l  
i n  S e c t i o n  4 .  'The a l l o c a t i o n s  i n  Sec t ions  2 and 3 must be  
integer valued: t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  r e l a x e d  i n  Sec t ion  5.  
2 .  MOMENT C2-lMES 
We are given X > O r  p > 0 ,  and a  i j f o r  i ,  j l O l  
with 0 - < a i j  - < A for a l l  i ,  j .  The s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  p l a y e r s  
I and 11 a r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  - x and y over  t h e  
non-negative i n t e g e r s ,  and t h e  payoff i s  
The opt imal  s t r a t e g i e s  - x *  and y* can be obta ined  
by so lv ing  the  fo l lowing two l i n e a r  programs, where M = [A/XI  
and N = [ A / p j .  
Program 1. 
s u b j e c t  t o  
minimize u + p  j y j  
j = O  
N 
s u b j e c t  t o  1 Yj = 1 
j=O 
Program 1 h a s  M + 2 v a r i a b l e s  and N + 2 c o n s t r a i n t s ,  a 
f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  (xi = 6 (i) , v = 0) , a bounded o b j e c t i v e  
funct ion  (v - < A i f  t h e  j = 0 c o n s t r a i n t  h o l d s ) ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  a t  l e a s t  one optimal s o l u t i o n  (v* ,x*) with 
v* - < A .  Program 2 h a s  N + 2 v a r i a b l e s  and M + 2 c o n s t r a i n t s ,  
a f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  (yj = 6 ( j ) ,  u = A ) ,  a (lower) bounded 
o b j e c t i v e  func t ion  (u  - > 0 i f  the i = 0 c o n s t r a i n t  h o l d s ) ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  a t  l e a s t  one optimal s o l u t i o n  (u*,y*) wi th  
M N 
- i x *  u* > 0 -  L e t  v(hIi i)  = Iizo Ij=-, aijx2y3, X ( A I u )  = li=O i ' 
N 
and Y ( A ,  p) = 1 j=O j y j  Since Program 1 is  t h e  dual  of 
Program 2 [Charnes, 19531, 
for any y. S i m i l a r l y ,  A(x,y*) F u* + yY ( A  f o r  any - x ,  
s o  - x* and y* a r e  optimal and e i t h e r  of t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  
i n  (1) i s  t h e  value o f  t h e  game. 
k When t h e r e  are K payoff mat r ices  ( a .  . k = 1 . . . , 1 7  
k * 
with 0 ( a i j  i%, l e t  ' vk ,Ek*) and u Y k *  be t h e  
s o l u t i o n  of the kth - vers ion  o f  Programs 1 and 2 r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
obvious manner. 
TABLE O F  CONTENTS 
1 . LmRODUCTION ................................... 
2 . M O M E N T G M S  ................................... 
3 . BLOTTO m S  ................................... 
4 . APPROXIMATE PLAY ............................... 









TABLE OF SYMBOLS 
a r e a  index used when more than one a r e a  i s  considered. 
i .  
u n i t  c o s t s  f o r  s i d e s  I and 11. 
payoff when I a l l o c a t e s  i and I1 a l l o c a t e s  j 
t o  a rea  k. 
upper bound on a k i j '  
maximum a l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  I and 11. 
equi l ibr ium payoff i n  a rea  k .  
average u n i t  consumption i n  equi l ibr ium by 
I and I1 i n  a rea  k. 
s o l u t i o n s  of a  l i n e a r  program and i t s  dual  
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sets of f e a s i b l e  marginal d i s t r i b u t i o n  v e c t o r s  
i n  the  moment game. 
optimal marginal d i s t r i b u t i o n  vec to r s  i n  
moment game. 
t h e  
indexes a t t e m p t s  to so lve  moment game 
s e t s  of f e a s i b l e  vec to r s  of i n t e g e r s  i n  t h e  B lo t to  game. 
A 1 s e t s  of m i x e d  s t r a t e g i e s  on TI (x) . ( y )  . 
M ~ ~ ( Y )  f 
value of the Blo t to  game. 
iii 
k 
K matrices (a:j) a r e  g iven ,  w i th  0 < aij < 
- - 
and two i n t e g e r  r e s o u r c e  l e v e l s  X and Y. The payoff  f u n c t i o n  
K k k k  a x . y  . The s e t s  of f e a s i b l e  i s  V(xty)  - - = Ikzl I ~ = o  i j  1 j 
s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  I and II are 
The q u a n t i t y  xk can be  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i 
t h a t  I uses  i u n i t s  i t h e  k th  a r e a ,  i n  which case  a  s t r a t e g y  
-
f o r  p l a y e r  I can be s e e n  t o  be  a se t  of p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i -  
bu t ions ,  one f o r  each area, for which t h e  o v e r a l l  mean number 
of u n i t s  used i s  X. S i m i l a r l y  f o r  11. 
THEOREM 1. Suppose x = IK x ( L d  and Y = E:=~ yk(h,u) k=l k  
f o r  some L e t  x* c SI ( X )  b e  de f ined  by 
- 
f o r  
f o r  
and let X* S I I ( ~ )  be d e f i n e d  by 
Then V(x,y*) - - < V(x*,y) - - f o r  any - x 6 ST (XI , 41 in 
S ~ I  (Y) . The value of t h e  game is V(Z*,Y*) = lE=l vk(X,u) 
Since v i  & Ak and Nk= [Ak/pI , t he  i n e q u a l i t y  
c o r r e c t  f o r  a l l  j > 0.  It fol lows t h a t  
- 
S i m i l a r l y ,  
K 
v(~,y*) - < ( 2  + A ,  f o r  - x c 
k=l 
According t o  (1) , 
SO 
i s  a c t u a l l y  
SIT (Y) 
s, (XI . 
Since and are a r b i t r a r y ,  t h e  theorem fo l lows .  q .e .d .  
- 
We w i l l  refer t o  games of t h i s  t y p e  a s  "moment games," 
because t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  wi th  
f i x e d  means. A moment game is so lved  i f  h and 1.1 a r e  found 
s u c h t h a t  x ( X , u )  x ( h , ~ )  = X  and Y ( h , u )  a l K  Y ( A , ~ ) = Y  k=l k 
I f  (ak ) i s  a d i f f e r e n t  payoff m a t r i x  f o r  each k ,  t hen  i j 
each e v a l u a t i o n  of > ; ( X I  v )  and Y ( 1 , ~ )  r e q u i r e s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
of K l i n e a r  p r o g r a m s .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  one w i l l  have t o  stop 
computing a f t e r  computing X ( X , 2 )  and A )  f o r  N 
p a i r s  ( hv,uv) , v = I,.. ' . , N ,  a t  which p o i n t  it w i l l  be 
neces sa ry  t o  a p p r o x i m a t e  lT ( X , Y )  . The n e x t  theorem d e a l s  wi th  
t h i s  a p p r o x i m a t i o n .  
THEOREM 2 .  L e t  bo = O f  CO = I E = ~ A ~ ~  Xo = 0 ,  Yo = 0 ,  and,  
f o r  v > 1 
- 
Then IImin - < JI(X,Y) llmax, where nmin 
are t h e  opt imized o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  i n  Programs 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Program A 
N 
maximize 1 pvbv 
v=o 
Progran B 
minimize 1 qvcv  v=o 
and 
A an 
PROOF. L e t  s* and ~6 be the unique elements of Sx ( 0 )  
0 0 
and. SII ( 0 )  , and le t  vk = 0 and uk = Ak. For 
v - > 1, l e t  ( be t h e  opt imal  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  ( h v ,  u v )  . and 
v let vk and uv be t h e  optimal va lues  of k V; and u]: i n  t h e  
kth - vers ion  of programs 1 and 2 f o r  ( X v ,  !.I,) . Then, f o r  v > 1, 
- 
- u v Y  if y C SIX K v V(5:d 2 Vk ( Y )  . Since X v  = l k = l ~ k  - I J , Y ~ ,  
this can a l s o  be w r i t t e n  V(x*,x) > bv f o r  \J > 1. T h e  
-v - - 
r e l a t i o n  i s  a l s o  t r u e  f o r  v = 0 ,  so  
f o r  any p r o b a b i l i t y  v e c t o r  (PO.. . . , P N ) .  L e t  x = 'rN P x*. 
- Lv=0 v-\j 
- 
N Then x C S (1' P v X v ) ,  and V(gM,x)  E v z O  
-M I V-0 P v V ( x * , ~ )  .- on 
account of the  l i n e a r i t y  of V ( 5 , y )  i n  x. I f  
- 
P X < X I  zM E SI ( X I  , hence Program A f o r  nmin L o  v v -  is a 
lower bound on X Y  . S i m i l a r l y ,  V(x,y?) ( cv f o r  v > 1 
- 
and - x SI ( X I  a n d ,  s i n c e  v (xl$) )*)( co , t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  i s  
c o r r e c t  f o r  v = 0,. , . , N. The r e s u l t  is Program i3 f o r  
REMARK. Programs A and B a r e  no t  d u a l s ,  s o  
'min < 'max 
i n  genera l ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  upper and lower bounds on l l ( X , Y )  * 
EXAMPLE. 1 K = l ,  a i j  = 1 i f  i > 10,  0  i f  i < 1 0 ,  X =  5 ,  
- 
Y = 5, hl = .05, U1 = .05.  Player  I wins i f  h e  ass igns  LO 
u n i t s  o r  more, o t h e r w i s e  he l o s e s .  Player  11's u n i t s  a r e  
u s e l e s s .  We f i n d  
= 1, Xl = 10.  Yl = 0 ,  b1 = 1-  .05(5-0) = . 7 5 ,  
and cl = 1 + . 05  (5-10) = . 7 5 .  The so lu t ion  t o  Program A i s  
(PO,P1) = ( . 5 , . 5 )  and ll min = . 3 7 5 .  T h e  so lu t ion  t o  
Program B is  (qO,ql) = ( 0 , 1 ) ,  and nmax = . 7 5 .  Actual ly ,  
II(5,5)  = .5 .  T h i s  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  need f o r  Theorem 2 ,  
s i n c e  w e  w i l l  f i n d  n V  = 1 or  0 unless h = .l, whereas 
TI (X ,Y)  = .5 .  The problem i s  t h a t  X ( A , y )  and Y ( h , p )  a r e  
discont inuous func t ions  of ( A ,  y)  . i7 (X,Y) could nonethe less  
be wel l  approximated even i f  A v  # .1 f o r  a l l  v .  
COMMENTS. 
1) The primary use o f  moment games i s  a s  an approximation 
t o  B lo t to  games, t o  be discussed in  the next  sec t ion .  
2 )  I f  a i j  i s  convex i n  j f o r  a l l  i o r  concave i n  i 
f o r  a l l  j ,  then  Player I1 o r  Player  I ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
has an op t ima l  pure s t r a t e g y ,  and the re  a r e  s impler  ways 
of determining Vk ( A ,  u )  than what we have descr ibed.  
3 )  There a r e  some closed form solu t ions  of moment games. 
Matheson (1967) solved a c l a s s  of problems where K 
i d e n t i c a l  t a r g e t s  are  attacked by X weapons and defended 
by Y i n t e r c e p t o r s ,  a t  most one of which can be ass igned 
t o  a  given weapon. Both weapon 
K 
i 1 ik 1 0 ik = X I  ik i n t e g e r  
k=l 
K 
iijk 0, jk = Y ,  jk i n t e g e r  k=l 
The p a y o f f  i s  
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of ik i s  " t h e  number of  u n i t s  I a s s i g n s  
t o  a r e a  k," s i m i l a r l y  f o r  jk, and a is t h e  payof f  t o  i j 
I i n a r e a  k when i of  1's u n i t s  and j o f  11's u n i t s  
are a s s i g n e d .  X and Y are t h e  t o t a l  i n v e n t o r i e s  of I 
and TI. 
It may a p p e a r t h a t B l o t t o  G a m e s  a r e  s i m p l e r  t h a n  
moment games. I t  i s  true t h a t  B l o t t o  G a m e s  a r e  easier t o  
comprehend t h a n  moment games (it is  e a s i e r  t o  imagine p l a y i n 9  
o n e ) ,  b u t  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  i s  o t h e r w i s e  f a l s e .  B l o t t o  G a m e s  
b e l o n g  t o  t h e  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  l a r g e  class o f  games where t h e  
number of s t r a t e g i e s ,  t hough  f i n i t e ,  i s  t o o  l a r g e  t o  p e r m i t  
s o l u t i o n  by any t e c h n i q u e  t h a t  i n v o l v e s  e n u m e r a t i o n ,  and  y e t  
Note t h a t  SI ( X )  --the set  of s t r a t e g i e s  i n  the 
corresponding moment game--is n o t  the  s e t  of a l l  mixed 
s t r a t e g i e s  on TI ( X )  : The l a t t e r  ( c a l l  it M= (x) ) i s  a 
- ,  
c o l l e c t i o n  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f (i-) i n  X-space 
such t h a t  f(i) - = 0 u n l e s s  lEz1 ik = X. ~ e t t i n g  - xk be 
t h e  k th  marginal  of such an f (  9 )  ( x t  being t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
I 
-
t h a t  i u n i t s  a r e  ass igned t o  a r e a  k)  , w e  can say  t h a t  
1 K ( 2  , . . . , ) C SI ( X )  . I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  each mixed s t r a t e g y  
f 6 M I ( X )  corresponds t o  a d e f i n i t e  element ( t h e  v e c t o r  of  
marg ina l s )  i n  SI ( X )  , which correspondence w i l l  be i n d i c a t e d  
1 - 1 K 
by f + x - . . . . Given an a r i b t r a r y  element 
- x = (5 ,. . . ,z ) 
i n  S,(X) , w e  w i l l  say t h a t  5 i s  p layable  i f  t h e r e  is an I I 
f < M I ( X )  such t h a t  f + - x. 
p layab le  
nonplayable 
Not a l l  elements of SxIX) are playable; for example, 
k if s o m e m a r g i n a l  x in x i s  such that x l  > 0 for i > X, 
- - 
then x is not playable. I n  the Blot to  G a m e ,  w i t h  a to ta l  
- 
of X u n i t s  for K t a r g e t s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  that more t h a n  
X w i l l  be assigned to the kth "carget must be 0 .  T h i s  i s  
-
n o t  necessarily so in the moment game, w h e r e  p l a y e r  I is i n  
e s s e n c e  restricted o n l y  t o  u s i n g  X u n i t s  on the average. 
S i m i l a r  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  of course, a p p l y  t o  P l a y e r  11. 
The subject of p l a y a b i l i t y  is an i m p o r t a n t  one on 
account of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
THEOREM 3. L e t  II (X,Y) be the value of the moment game, and 
IIg (X,Y) b e  t h e  v a l u e  of the Blo t to  Game. L e t  x* and x* 
- 
be  o p t i m a l  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  t h e  moment game. I f  x*  i s  play-  
- 
ab le ,  then X B ( X , Y )  , l I ( X , Y ) .  I f  y* is  playable ,  t h e n  
n,(x,y)  2 II ( x , Y ) .  
PROOF. For x C S  (X) and C Txx  (Y) , l e t  
- I 
K t" Then G ( x , i )  = V l x , x (  j) 1 , where G(5.i) = LkP1 k i Z O  a. xjk x i' 
7- 
j = 1 if jk = j. Suppose f + x * ,  where f i M x ( X )  
J - 
a n d  - x* i S I ( X ) .  Then 
where Ef denotes e x p e c t a t i o n  when i i s  drawn from f .  
- 
The e q u a l i t y  i s  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  e x p e c t a t i a n  of a 
sum i s  t h e  sum of  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  Since 
13 
k X ) = 1 ak x*k 
E f ( a i k ,  jk i = O  i j ,  i ' 
where t h e  l a s t  i n e q u a l i t y  
f o r  any C S I I ( y ) .  The 
i s  p layable  is  s imi la r .  
* 
> II(X,Y) is due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  V ( 2  r x  -
* 
proof t h a t  ILB(X,Y) ( ( x f Y )  when y 
EXAMPLES. 
I n  t h e  f i r s t  two of t h e  following examples, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  only two a r e a s  and s m a l l  va lues  f o r  X and Y makes 
it p o s s i b l e  t o  so lve  t h e  Blot to  Game e a s i l y  by enumeration. 
whereas t h e  moment game r e q u i r e s  l i n e a r  p rograming .  This  should 
n o t  obscure t h e  f a c t  t h a t  moment games, i n  genera l ,  a r e  much 
e a s i e r  t o  s o l v e  than Blo t to  G a m e s .  
1. X = 4 ,  Y = 4 ,  and t h e r e  a r e  two i d e n t i c a l  a r e a s  with a = 1 i j 
i f  i > j , a = 0 i f  i < j. TI ( X )  and TI= (Y)  have only i j - 
f i v e  elements,  and t h e  payoff mat r ix  i s  
BY u s i n g  l i n e a r  programming, t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  moment 
game i s  d i s c o v e r e d  t o  be 
with n ( 4 , 4 )  = -8. Both p l a y e r ' s  opt imal  s t r a t e g i e s  in t h e  
moment game a re  p layab le  i n  t h e  B lo t to  game. 
2 .  The same except X = 3. 
FIGURE 3  
/ 
In t h i s  case ng ( 3  , 4 )  = .5. &I optimal s t r a t e g y  f o r  I is t o  
f l i p  a coin to u s e  ,(0,3) o r  ( 3 , 0 ) ,  and an optimal s t r a t g y  
f o r  11 i s  t o  f l i p  a co in  t o  use (1.3) o r  ( 3  , 1 . 1's 
x A = x L =  ( s 5 1  O r  0 ,  . 5 ,  O f  O f . . . ) .  11's optimal s t r a t e g y  - - 
1 2  1 2 ( 4 ) ,  where y = y = ( 0 ,  .5, 0, . 5 ,  0 ,  0 t - = . )  
The s o l u t i o n  of t h e  corresponding Blo t to  G a m e  i s  
* 
x = (x1*,x2*), - - where x = x = (.4, .15,  .15, .45,  -15, 2 * 
- -
- 
1" 2 *  * 
'* 2 * ) ,  where y = l  0 ,  0 ,  O , . . . )  , and y = ( y  12 
= ( . 2 ,  . 2 ,  . 2 ,  . 2 ,  . 2 ,  0 ,  0 ,  ... 1.  Player  11's s t r a t e g y  
i s  p layable ,  s o  necessa r i ly  II B (3 ,4 )  < l I (3 ,4) .  P layer  1's - 
s t r a t e g y  i s  not  playable.  Actua l ly ,  11(3,4) = . 6 .  
3 .  The same as Example 2 except  t h e r e  a r e  20 a r e a s ,  X = 30, and 
Y = 40, SO t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t h e  same number of u n i t s  per  a r e a  
as i n  Example 2 .  The s o l u t i o n  of the  moment game i s  
I n  t h i s  case,  the  B lo t to  Game cannot be so lved  by 
enumeration, bu t  s t i l l  i t  is c l e a r  t h a t  IIB(30,40) = 6 
because each p l a y e r ' s  opt imal  s t r a t e g y  i s  p layable .  I n  
f a c t ,  s i n c e  20x1* - = (8 ,  3 ,  3 ,  3 ,  3 ,  0 ,  0 ,  ... 1 ,  Player  I 
ass igns  0 u n i t s  t o  8 a reas  s e l e c t e d  a t  random, 1 u n i t  t o  
3 a reas  s e l e c t e d  a t  random from t h e  remaining 12, e t c . ,  
thus making t h e  marginal d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  number of 
k* u n i t s  assigned t o  each area - x . Player  11 a s s i g n s  0 
t o  4 a r e a s ,  e t c .  
The quest ion of remains an open one: t h a t  is ,  
given X marginal d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  each def ined  on some subse t  of 
t h e  r e a l s  Sk, t h e r e  i s  no p r a c t i c a l  technique f o r  determining 
whether o r  no t  t h e r e  i s  a j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  defined on t h e  c r o s s  
product of S1, S2, . . . , SK f o r  which - 
xl + - * * +  x~ - 
E(X1) + - * +  E ( X K )  with p r o b a b i l i t y  1 and Xk has  t h e  given marginal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  a l l  k. T h i s  i s  t r u e  even when a l l  t he  marginals  
k  
a r e  i d e n t i c a l ,  a s  they  w i l l  b e  when a i j  = a i j f o r  a l l  i, j t  k .  
However, t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h a t  l ead  t o  t h e  con- 
c lus ion  t h a t  t h e r e  is  no p l a y a b i l i t y  problem when t h e  number of 
a r e a s  i s  l a rge .  
In  genera l ,  l e t  t h e  random v a r i a b l e  be t h e  assignment 
- 
- 
K 2 t o  t h e  k t h  a r e a ,  with uk = E ( X k ) ,  Ikzl = X, ok = Var(Xk), and 
C.D.F.  Fk. Suppose f i r s t  t h a t  we choose Zk from Fk independent 
of a l l  o t h e r  According  
- - 
t h e  Law of Large Numbers w e  can 
K 
expect t h e  q u a n t i t y  !Ikzl Zk - X ( / K  = " e r r o r  per  a rea"  t o  be 
small  i f  K i s  l a r g e  and i f  t h e  ok a r e  ( f o r  example) bounded. 
The impl ica t ion  i s  t h a t  some procedure such as "consider t h e  
t a r g e t s  i n  sequence, l e t t ing  Xk = Zk as long a s  t h e r e  a r e  u n i t s  
l e f t "  would have a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  r i g h t  marginals  f o r  l a r g e  K. 
One can improve on this method by us ing  var iance  reduct ion  
techniques i n  s e l e c t i n g  t h e  Xkt  t ak ing  advantage of t h e  f a c t  that 
t h e r e  is no requirement f o r  them t o  be independent. By s e l e c t i n g  
t h e  samples i n  p a i r s ,  v a l u e s  f o r  one can be made t o  correspond 
t o  s m a l l  va lues  of  the otmrr s o  t h a t  t h e  sum is more or l e s s  
c o n s t a n t .  Suppose, for example, t h a t  X1 and X2 have t h e  
-, 
i 
l a r g e s t  ranges  amongst a l l  d i s t r i b u t i o n s .  I f  U i s  a uniform 
random v a r i a b l e  i n  w, 11 , t hen  X1 = - F-I (U) and X2 F2 (1 - U)  - 
have d i s t r i b u t i o n s  F~ and F2 ,  where -1 denotes  i n v e r s e  
-1 f u n c t i o n s ,  and Xl + x > mino <,<, F ; ~  (u )  + F2 (1-u) : M12. 2 - 
- - 
- I n  f a c t ,  we can w r i t e  X1 + X2 - M12 + z 1 2  where Z12 i s  a non- 
n e g a t i v e  random v a r i a b l e  w i th  a smaller range than  t h a t  of  e i t h e r  
Xl Or X2. For  example, i f  Fl and F2 a r e  bo th  
4 . l S ,  .15, -15, - 1 5 ,  0 ,  0,. . .) , a s  found i n  Example 2 ,  
then  M12 = 2 ,  as c a n  be seen  from Figure  4 :  
FIGURE: 4 
+ 5121 where Z12 = 0 , 1. wi th  . 4  prob ,  
and 2 w i t h  . 3  prob.  The procedure  can $ 4  " a r d s ;  t h a t  i s ,  
samples of ZL2 one can g e t  samples o f  X1 and X2 by 
choos ing  U a t  random w i t h i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l  set.  Thus, 
F~ and p2 can e s s e n t i a l l y  be r e p l a c e d  i n  t h e  l i s t  of m a r g i n a l ~  
by pL2 the C .  D.F. of Z 12. Continuing i n  t h i s  manner, one 
w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  a r r i v e  at a l i s t  w i t h  o n l y  one marg ina l .  I f  t h i s  
marginal  h a s  v a r i a n c e  Q t h e  o r g i n a l  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  p l a y a b l e ,  
1f n o t ,  +-hen t h e  initial "sample"  of t h i s  random v a r i a b l e  w i l l  
have t o  be  its mean ( w h i c h  w i l l  a lways be  an i n t e g e r ) ,  and t h e  
working backwards p r o c e s s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  marg ina l s  which a r e  " n o t  
q u i t e "  F1, F ~ ,  e t c .  III Example 2 ,  i f  P l a y e r  I a t t e m p t s  t o  use  
t h i s  p rocess  i n  t r y i n g  t o  p l a y  h i s  moment game marg ina l  i n  t h e  
i n t e g e r  game, he w i l l  have t o  choose ZL2 = 1 always,  and w i l l  
consequent ly  end up p i c k i n g  1 ( 0 , 3 ) ,  1 , 2 ,  (3 ,O)  I w i th  
p r o b a b i l i t y  [ .375, .12 5 , . l 2 5 ,  .375 1 , t o  be  compared wi th  t h e  
op t ima l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  f . 5,  0 ,  0 ,  . 5  I . The a s s o c i a t e d  marg ina l  
i s  ( - 3 7 5 ,  .125, .125,  - 3 7 5 ,  0 ,  0  ,...), to be compared 
wi th  t h e  "goal"  of 4 -15, .15,  .15 ,  .15, 0 , 0 , .  . .)  . 
with  f o u r  areas and  t w i c e  a s  many u n i t s  f o r  each s i d e  
(X = 6 ,  Y = 8)  t h e  P r o c e d u r e  succeeds  i n  p l ay ing  t h e  (unchanged) 
moment game marginal  i n  the i n t e g e r  game, s i n c e  F~~ = Fg4 i s  
symmetric- Note t h a t  6 x ( 4  .l .15, .15, .15, 0 ,  . . . )  i s  
n o t  a  v e c t o r  o f  i n t e g e r s  ; t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  p lay-  
a b i l i t y ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r y .  
The v a r i a n c e  r e d u c t i o n  t echn ique  d i s c u s s e d  above is a p p l i e d  
t o  a  l a r g e r  example in B e a l e  and Heselden [1962] . 
because it is possible e a s i l y  g e n e r a t e  Ul and u2 such t h a t  
19 
U1 + *2 = 1 and both random v a r i a b l e s  a r e  uniform i n  10 , 11 . In 
c e r t a i n  c i rcumstances  (for example i f  t h e r e  a r e  e x a c t l y  n  > 2 
i d e n t i c a l  a r e a s )  it would a l s o  be u s e f u l  t o  g e n e r a t e  U1, . . . , U, 
such t h a t  U1 +- * +  =n/2 and a l l  n  random v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
'n 
uniform i n  [0,1]. T o  show t h a t  t h i s  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  w e  f i r s t  n o t e  
the t r i g o n a m e t r i c  i d e n t i t y  
fo r  any ( R ,  El) . T h i s  sugges t s  t h e  fol lowing procedure:  
1) Find a d i s t r i b u t i o n  FR such t h a t  R c o s  O i s  uniform i n  
- 1 2  1 /21  when O is  uniform i n  10,Znl and R i s  
independent of Q. 
2 .  L e t  R and O be s e l e c t e d  a s  i n  1, and l e t  
= ' + R C O S ( @  + Zni /n) ,  i = 1 ,..., n. Then U l , . .  ., Un 
'i T 
w i l l  have the r equ i r ed  p r o p e r t i e s .  
According t o  F e l l e r  [ l97O],  IR' c o s  01 w i l l  be uniform i n  [0 ,1]  
P ( R 5 r )  = 1 - (2r ) '  f o r  0 - < r - < 1/2.  If U i s  uniform 
i n  [O, 1 1 ,  then  R = . 5  has such a d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  s o  
computer implementation would r e q u i r e  t a k i n g  a  s q u a r e  r o o t .  
~ ~ ~ ~ i d ~ w i n g  t h e  marginal d i s t r i b u t i o n s  Fi i n  groups l a r g e r  
than two is now p o s s i b l e ,  and w i l l  be  adv i sab le  t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  
-1 Fi (ui)  t e n d s  t o  be cons tant  when 1Yz1 ui i s .  Even i n  
cases  of symmetry, however, va r i ance  may be reduced most by con- 
s i d e r i n g  t h e  m a r g i n a l s  i n  smal l  groups, r a t h e r  than  a l l  a t  once. 
For example, if n = 5 and a l l  marginals  a r e  F,  the  b e s t  pro- 
-1 - 
cedure may be  to form Z12 = F - ' ( U ~ )  + F ( U 2 )  and Z 3 4 5  - 
-1 1 -1 1 -1 1 F (ul) + F (u2 )  + F (U3), where 5 2  and 2345  a r e  inde- 
pendent, and t h e n  combine t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  Z12 and Z 3 4 5 ,  
r a t h e r  than t o  o b t a i n  Z12345 immediately. There has  been no 
experimentation a l o n g  t h e s e  l i n e s .  
S UMP4ARY. 
Whether o r  n o t  one can s o l v e  a B l o t t o  Game by the  technique 
of so lv ing  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  moment game hinges  on whether t h e  
marginals i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of t h e  moment game a r e  p layable  i n  t h e  
Blot to  Game. W e  have  argued t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  be approximately t h e  
case  when t h e  number of a r e a s  i s  " l a r g e ,  " and have presented  some 
techniques f o r  approx imate  p lay .  Of course,  i t  i s  when t h e  number 
of a reas  i s  h r g @  t h a t  s o l u t i o n  of a Blo t to  Game by enumeration of 
s t r a t e g i e s  i s  least f e a s i b l e .  
E U R C I S E S  
1. Make a f e w  t r i a l s  a t  p l a y i n g  2 . 2 ,  . 2 ,  . 2 ,  - 2 ,  O f  0,. . . )  
when t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  areas and X = 6 by u s i n g  t h e  3-way 
variance r e d u c t i o n  procedure .  Is t h e  sum Xl + x2 + x3 
a lways  a c o n s t a n t ?  
2.  T h e r e  i s  an e x a c t  way ( i n  f a c t  many ways) o f  p l a y i n g  t h e  
m a r g i n a l  i n  Problem 1. F i n d  one.  Your answer w i l l  b e  o f  
the form "Play (4,2,0f  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  .05,"  etc.  
5 .  THE CQNTINUQUS VERSION 
I n  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  v e r s i o n ,  a l l o c a t i o n s  i n  b o t h  t h e  B l o t t o  
game and t h e  moment game a r e  r e a l  and non-negat ive ,  b u t  n o t  
necessariZy i n t e g e r ,  T h i s  means t h a t  it is no l o n g e r  p o s s i b l e  
t o  solve moment games w i t h  L i n e a r  Programming; n o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e  
most f r u i t  u l  approach t o  t h e  B l o t t o  G a m e  i s  s t i l l  g e n e r a l l y  
th rough  the a s s o c i a t e d  moment game. 
I n  a moment game w i t h  one a r e a  and payoff  k e r n e l  A ( x , y ) ,  
l e t  
F b e  a C.D.F. for P l a y e r  I 
G be a C.D.F. f o r  P l a y e r  I1 
Then E (F,G) is  the  payof f  f u n c t i o n ,  and t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  F and G are 
s ~ c h  t h a t  1, x d F ( x )  2 E ( F )  = X  (Iw y d G ( y )  Z E ( G )  = Y ) .  A h e u r i s t i c  r u l e  00  
u s e f u l  i n  s o l v i n g  such  games i s  t h a t  E (F,  y )  v - yy, w i t h  
e q u a l i t y  o v e r  s o m e  i n t e r v a l ,  and E (x, G )  - < u + Ax, w i t h  e q u a l i t y  
o v e r  t h e  same i n t e r v a l ,  when F and G a r e  op t ima l  [ S c h r i e b e r ,  
19681. The i d e a  i s  t o  u s e  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  E (F ,y )  = v - liY and 
E ( x , G )  = p + Ax t o  de t e rmine  t h e  p r o p e r  form fo r  F and G I  
such  as  i n  games on t h e  u n i t  s q u a r e  where y = X = 0 (Owen, 19681. 
EXAMPLE. 
In t h i s  c a s e  E ( F , y )  = 1 - F ( y ) ,  s o  F(y) L 1 - v + 3iY. AS long  
a s  t h i s  is  t r u e ,  E (F, G )  v - uY.  Assume t h a t  F (y) = 1 - v + PY 
fo r  y  [O ,v/u I , so t h a t  F (v/p) = 1. P l a y e r  I chooses IJ 
and  v o p t i m a l l y  by s o l v i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  non - l i nea r  programming 
problem : 
maximize v - l.iY 
subject t o  O < v < l  - - 
2 
Equiva len t ly ,  t h e  problem i s  t o  maximize v - (Y/X)  (v / 2 )  w i t h  
v E [ O  , l] . The s o l u t i o n  can be found e a s i l y .  Let  R = X/Y. Then 
S i m i l a r l y ,  by s e t t i n q  
* 
we discover  t h a t  E ( F , G  2 V ( R )  f o r  any F, i . e . ,  V ( R )  i s  t h e  
value of the moment game. 
COMMENTS ON THE EXAMPLE 
1. V ( R )  = 1 - V ( l / R )  , i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  symmetry of t h e  two p l aye r s .  
2 .  The s t r o n g  p l a y e r ' s  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  uniform between 0 and tw ice  
h i s  awn mean. The weaker p l a y e r ' s  a l l o c a t i o n  is uniform over  
t h e  same i n t e r v a l ,  except  t h a t  t h e r e  is some p r o b a b i l i t y  of a 
0 a l l o c a t i o n .  Compare wi th  Example 2 o f  Sec t ion  3 ,  
24 
3. T h e  p l a y e r ' s  s t r a t e g y  i s  p l ayab le  i n  a  lotto Game 
wi th  m i d e n t i c a l  a r e a s  f o r  n  = 2 and n  = 3 ,  and t h e r e -  
f o r e  for  n  - > 2 (see d i s c u s s i o n  o f  p l a y a b i l i t y  i n  S e c t i o n  2 ) .  
Thi s  is no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s o  f o r  t h e  weaker p l a y e r .  
4 .  T h i s  game i s  " m a j o r i t y  s u l e s "  i n  i t s  most pure  form. The 
p a r a m e t e r s  A and y i n  t h i s  c a s e  can be determined 
e x p l i c i t l y  as f u n c t i o n s  of X and Y. I n  d i s c r e t e  c a s e s  
app rox ima t ing  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e s e  formulas  should be  
r e a s o n a b l e  i n i t i a l  gues ses  f o r  X and p i n  t h e  i t e r a t i v e  
p r o c e d u r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2 .  
5 .  Thi s  game e x h i b i t s  a  phenomenon common i n  B l o t t o  games; t h e  
s t r o n g e r  p l a y e r ' s  s t r a t e g y  is i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  weaker 
p l a y e r ' s  s t r e n g t h ,  and the weaker p l a y e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  be  
loca lLy  s t r o n g  by s a c r i f i c i n g  i n  c e r t a i n  a r e a s  o r  a t  c e r t a i n  
t i m e s .  
A s  m i g h t  be expected,  c l o s e d  form s o l u t i o n s  a r e  easier t o  
o b t a i n  when a l l o c a t i o n s  a r e  r e a l  t han  when a l l o c a t i o n s  must be 
i n t e g e r .  S c h r e i b e r  11968 I d i s c u s s e s  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  o b t a i n -  
ing a s o l u t i o n ,  and d e a l s  wi th  a  modi f ied  " m a j o r i t y  r u l e s "  game 
i n  some d e t a i l :  
e target damage depends on ly  on weapons ass igned  (x)  
when x ( y. When O (x) = 0 and 4 (u)  = 1, t h e  example given  
earlier results. When @ (x) = 0 and @(u) = 1 - exp ( -au)  , 
then + ( u )  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of k i l l i n g  the 
target when the re  are u more weapons than i n t e r c e p t o r s ,  w i th  
- 
(-a) E P = single sho t  k i l l  p r o b a b i l i t y .  I f  X = A/T 
e 
and Y = I/T are t h e  average numbers of  weapons and i n t e r c e p t o r s  
per target, then  t h e  value of t h e  game (PK) i s  [Galiano,  19691: 
6 2  - < (defense  dominance) 
then 
2-2 S X ~ O Y  - + 3 ?  ( a t t a c k  dominance) 
Note t h a t  PK must be solved f o r  j o i n t l y  wi th  the unknowns u 
- 
and v when X i s  large.  T h i s  i s  messy, but  PK i n  any c a s e  
depends only an aA/T and aI/T, so t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  can 
be shown g r a p h i c a l l y  (F igure  5 )  . 

EXERCISE. 
The produc t  PA i s  s o m e t i m e s  used as a measure of t h e  
"power" of an a t t a c k i n g  force, s i n c e  it represents  "average 
t a r g e t s  k i l l e d  wi th  one s h o t  a g a i n s t  each and no defense." 
U s e  Figure 2 t o  c o n s t r u c t  an example where t h e  a t t a c k e r ,  g iven 
h i s  cho ice  of t w o  ( P , A )  p a i r s ,  would choose t h e  one w i t h  t h e  
s m a l l e r  power. p HINT:  I n t u i t i v e l y ,  t h e  a t t a c k e r  ought t o  pu t  
m o r e  emphasis on A t han  on P ,  s i n c e  even a poor weapon 
serves t h e  purpose of exhaus t ing  t h e  defense .  
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